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ARTFL, LEFFTDS), and willingness
among members of familial FTLD kin-
dreds to participate in natural history stu-
dies is high. In addition, several
interventions that may impact FTLD-
related proteinopathies are nearing clin-
ical trial readiness. The future thus ap-
pears bright for disease-modifying
familial FTLD trials. The data by
Jiskoot et al. underscore the importance
of multimodal MRI, as well as a com-
prehensive battery of clinical and neuro-
psychological measures, in ongoing
observational and future clinical trials.
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Generating truth from error: insights from
neurodevelopmental disorders
This scientiﬁc commentary refers to
‘Impaired forward model updating in
young adults with Tourette syn-
drome’, by Kim et al. (doi:10.1093/
brain/awy306).
‘If only one person had, once, made a
bodily movement—could the question
exist, whether it was voluntary or invo-
luntary?’ (Wittgenstein, 1980).
In the answer are revealed two incon-
testable features of the biology of
voluntary action, incontestable because
they are conceptually given and so
impregnable to empirical attack. First,
to be able to say of someone that she
acted voluntarily we must be able to
say that she could have acted other-
wise even if, in the event, she did
not. This implies a plurality of condi-
tion-movement associations—includ-
ing the absence of movement—and a
mechanism for selecting between them.
A substrate that instantiates this,
neurally or mechanically, can only be
described as embodying a model, for
that is what a set of rules of condi-
tional transformation is. Second, to
be able to act voluntarily one must
be able to act as one has never acted
before, for the learnt acquisition of
any ability implies it must have been
novel, once, and the ability here must
be autonomously acquired. So, the
model must be generative, capable
of interpolating across the high
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dimensional space of condition-move-
ment associations it has learnt.
How could models of this kind
operate in the brain? Since their objec-
tive is to orchestrate action, they must
be primarily optimized at the output,
not any point upstream, for that is
what they are deployed to shape.
Such forward models compare their
output estimates against reality as far
as the sensorium is capable of disclos-
ing it and then adjust to optimize
future predictions (Wolpert and
Ghahramani, 2000; Friston, 2018).
With respect to kinematic features,
the comparison might plausibly be a
simple loss function based on the
squared error of position; the more
complex objective functions needed
for teleological characteristics need
not alter the basic principle of optimiz-
ing predictive ﬁdelity. The model’s esti-
mate cannot be altered experimentally,
but the sensory signals it relies on for
comparison can be, at least within
modalities we can readily manipulate.
Pathological defects of model optimi-
zation may thereby be revealed.
This is the approach Kim and co-
workers (2019) elegantly apply, in
this issue of Brain, to Gilles de la
Tourette syndrome, a complex disor-
der characterized by prominent, poly-
morphous tics, whose frequent
comorbidity with other neurodevelop-
mental disorders involving impaired
behavioural control suggests a deep,
shared mechanism of causation.
Young adults with the syndrome
were compared against controls on a
double-step manual reaching task
employing a robotic manipulandum
designed to record reaching trajec-
tories while controlling visual feed-
back. On each trial, participants
reached from one of four ‘home’ posi-
tions to one of four ‘target’ positions,
returning to their starting point as the
second step. The movement was
obscured by a screen on which both
positions were brieﬂy visible only at
trial onset, leaving proprioception as
the only feedback throughout. Spatial
error was thus allowed to accumulate
across the trial, measured at the
target and home return terminations.
Though just as accurate and no more
variable on the outward leg, those
with the syndrome were less accurate
and more variable on the return.
Crucially, the return movement was
consistent with an updated model of
its initial position, compensating to
some degree for the error on the
way out, but the extent of updating
was attenuated compared with the
control group. It seems Gilles de la
Tourette syndrome is associated with
reduced model updating in a senso-
rially deprived environment: error is
detected, but the motor programme
is not sufﬁciently updated in response.
Correlation with comorbid atten-
tion deﬁcit hyperactivity disorder—
though not tic scores—suggests this
is not a narrowly motor defect. The
authors propose the attractive idea
that pathologically enhanced sensori-
motor noise may force a reduction in
the rate of model updating, for exam-
ple because the loss function becomes
less reliable. Indeed, when training
artiﬁcial neural networks, the optimal
learning rate is related to the scale of
Figure 1 The impossibility of private representations: mental or neural. In what has become known as the Private Language
Argument, Wittgenstein showed that a purely internal mental object can be neither created nor referenced because no criterion of correctness
can be applied (top). This is analogous to what we might call the Private Neural Signal Argument where an internal neural signal alone cannot set
the ground truth if it is itself created by error feedback (bottom).
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noise (Smith and Le, 2018). This
plausibly general phenomenon may
well explain some of the comorbid
diversity of neurodevelopmental
disorders.
The relation to the disturbed volun-
tariness of action in Gilles de la
Tourette syndrome is harder to
deﬁne. It is tempting to conceive of
the model’s estimate as an ‘internal
signal’ of the authorship and voluntari-
ness of a movement: the more accurate
the former, the stronger both of the
latter (Ganos et al., 2015). The same
logic, deployed across individuals, is
pursued by those who interpret
mirror neuron activity as reﬂective of
establishing a commonality between
self and other. But authorship is dis-
tinct from voluntariness. We are
never in any doubt that (say) a
sneeze, a blink, a cough, or a yawn is
our own, even though each is usually
involuntary and need not be accompa-
nied by an over-riding external trigger.
Alien penis syndrome is not a recog-
nized nosological entity despite our
manifest lack of control over erectile
dynamics. Equally, model accuracy is
not a plausible index of voluntariness.
The relative simplicity and stereotypy
of involuntary movements will tend
to render them accurately predictable.
Since a novel voluntary action will
naturally be associated with lower
model accuracy than a well rehearsed
one—the error, after all, is what drives
learning—the absurd implication is
that novelty and voluntariness must
be inversely related. Moreover, erro-
neous sensory feedback may not only
disrupt the correct attribution of volun-
tariness to a movement but also mista-
kenly attach it to an involuntary one,
indeed—as in the ‘moving rubber hand
illusion’ (Dummer et al., 2009)—to no
actual movement at all. Here the sup-
posedly authoritative internal criterion
is easily over ruled by an external sen-
sory stimulus.
There is a deeper, information-
theoretic objection. Empirical studies
tend to focus on adaptation, in
adults, after an action is already well
formed. But most features of action
cannot be genetically speciﬁed—there
is nowhere near enough room in the
genome (Nachev et al., 2018)—and
so must be learnt de novo. We must
explain not only how model estimates
are optimized but also how they are
generated in the ﬁrst place: the nature
of the ‘trial’, not just of the ‘error’.
Without loss of generality, we may
conceive of our model as the result
of the interaction between a generator
that proposes a set of movement char-
acteristics, and a discriminator that
evaluates their goodness with respect
to the objective. The generator must
be initialized with more or less
random noise—no other option is
available—and such organization as
it acquires can only come from its
operation within the model. The dis-
criminator is deﬁnitionally anchored
in sensorially-conveyed external rea-
lity, and must integrate information
across the typically vast spectrum of
internal and external factors material
to the shaping and selection of
actions. Crucially, for such a mechan-
ism to work neither component can
dominate: if the generator does not
yield to the discriminator, it deﬁni-
tionally cannot learn anything at all,
and if the discriminator always rejects
the generator, no new action could
ever emerge. The interaction will not
be the simple zero-sum game typically
employed in (say) generative adver-
sarial networks (Goodfellow et al.,
2014), but its nature cannot change
the fundamental point: no isolated
component of the model—and cer-
tainly not the generator—can be a
ground truth of either authorship or
voluntariness, for the information is
constitutionally widely distributed.
Indeed, the idea of a purely internal
neural signal is analogous to the idea
of a purely private mental object, and
fails for the same reason: an isolated
representation can be neither created
nor remain stable because the informa-
tion to create and sustain it cannot
arise (Wittgenstein, 1953). A private
language and a private neural signal
are equally—and information theoreti-
cally—impossible (Fig. 1).
The conceptual difﬁculties of volun-
tary action would not be so opaque
were the ﬁeld of motor control not so
focused on adults. Attempting to
understand the brain from its mature
operations is rather like attempting to
understand artiﬁcial neural networks
only after extensive training. Their soci-
etal impact aside, neurodevelopmental
disorders deserve much more intense
study of the kind Kim and her collea-
gues exemplify, uniquely illuminating
physiology from two intersecting
angles: development and pathology.
And that light will need amplifying
with large scale data, for the complex-
ity is here compounded by its wide dis-
persal over developmental age.
But we should also remember there
are problems that cannot be solved,
only dissolved. Wittgenstein may
well be right that the ‘sense of
agency’ is one of them:
‘But how do I know that this movement
was voluntary? — I don’t know this, I
manifest it.’ (Wittgenstein, 1980).
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